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Introduction
This essay is an adaptation and extension of a June 2006 keynote address delivered at
the Third International ‘An Enterprise Odyssey: Integration and Disintegration’
conference sponsored by the Faculty of Economics and Business at Zagreb
University. It is an attempt to provide a general framework and insights into the
process referred to as transition, that is, the transformation from authoritarian
socialism to democracy and capitalism which began in 1989 in Eastern Europe and
1991 in the former Soviet Union (FSU). The framework is firstly a typology of
variable that contributed to a more successful transition, yet it doing it was not
possible to construct a conceptual ‘fire wall’ between factors contributing to success
and my own views on most effective path through the transition process. References
make note of the major works which influenced the author’s positions on the
transition process. Statistical references are not listed since this was not the focal
point of the article, but they are based on data released by the World Bank, United
Nations’ European Economic Commission and the European Bank of Reconstruction
and Development. Transition, or if you prefer, transformation, in this part of the
world is a very complicated and revolutionary process that has involved a total of 28
countries; the former East Germany is not included but Montenegro is counted as a
separate country. Of these 28 counties, 25 are in different stages of their transition to
capitalism and democracy, but I would suggest that three of them (Belarus,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have not yet begun their ‘transition journey’.
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The essay posits three factors as the principal factors in determining the relative
success of these 28 transitioning countries. The first factor is the impact of historical
background and conditions which confronted each country at its transition starting
point in either 1989 or 1991. The second variable involves the policies undertaken by
the various governments in the 1990s. The third factor is the presence or absence of
external and/or internal military conflicts.
History, Culture and Starting Point
This variable is really a broad combination that includes historical background,
culture, and the situation which confronted individual countries at the very start of
their transition Odyssey. It is important to stress that historical backgrounds and
initial situations, whether this involves the groups’ collective memory, predominant
cultural traits and values, geography, relative levels of wealth, or macroeconomic
conditions, or economic structures, all varied considerably and strongly influenced
the transition process. For example, when comparing the impact of economic
structures, the Czech Republic’s more nimble and relatively efficient medium sized
industries, its boarder with the markets of the European Union (EU), and its powerful
tourist attraction in Prague which brought money into the country and helped keep
unemployment low, were all positive factors in prompting a forceful implementation
of market oriented reforms in the early 1990s. The Czech Republic’s neighbor, and
until 1993 co-inhabitant of the same political entity, Slovakia, was much more
dependent on large, non-consumer type industries (steel, armaments, chemicals)
which could not successfully compete for sales to the EU market and were
experiencing steep production slumps. Therefore, Slovakia was more concerned
about high unemployment than market oriented reforms. While the Czech Republic
pushed for price and trade liberalization, as well as voucher privatization, Slovakia
delayed some of its price and trade liberalization policies until 1998 and abandoned
voucher privatization in favor of slower privatization which favored those close to
the ruling elite. Slovakia’s early reforms did not promote independent market
influences and this variant was sometimes referred to as ‘crony capitalism’.
Ironically, Czech policies, especially rapid privatization via the voucher system,
under Finance Minister and later Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, were qualitatively
different from Slovakia, were not necessarily the ingredients for a successful
transition. In some ways, it could be argued that the Czech Republic achieved solid
economic growth by 2006 in spite of some of its early transition policies.
The transition process is complex. The component parts for success for failure are
numerous, not at all limited to the economic sphere, not static but subject to change
over the last seventeen years, and inter-related. In addition to differing economic
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structures, the saliency of the impact of relative wealth, which among other things
contributes significantly to the strength of the domestic market, must also be
considered. The difference, for example, between the relatively high GDP per capita
of Slovenia as opposed to the relative poverty of Macedonia in 1989, is an important
variable in the transition process. Furthermore, a common boarder with the larger and
more lucrative markets of EU-15 is an advantage enjoyed by several Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries. This advantage stands in marked contrast to the
extremely high transportation costs found in land locked Central Asian countries
which are much farther removed form EU markets and where it is not uncommon to
find political disagreements preventing the use of the most accessible and least
expensive routes for exporting goods.
It is also important to recognize that some CEE countries had made solid progress
in establishing a functioning civil society in the 1980s, that is, before their transition.
They did this despite the dominating presence of the state under communism. Poland
lead the way in establishing individual groups separate from the state control (Ekiert
and Kubic 1999). This sense of semi-independence from the authorities proved
advantageous in fostering political attitudes and activities which became a driving
force of their own and did not rely only on existing communist era political elites (as
was the case in countries like Ukraine and Romania). Additionally, potential
entrepreneurs were not inclined to first look to the state for approval before engaging
in activities leading to economic growth. Hungary implemented reforms, however
modest and non-fundamental in terms of eliminating their command economy,
beginning with the New Economic Mechanism in1968 (Nagy 2003), and Hungarian
firms were subcontracting from Western companies well before the collapse of
communism. Hungary’s experience with market mechanisms, however limited, as
well as its interaction western markets, foreign firms, economist from a number of
different countries, and international financial institutions can be contrasted to
Romania’s very limited external contacts or Albania which until 1989 was isolated
and in a unique Stalinist time warp.
Existing macroeconomic conditions in 1989 played a critical role in the transition
process. The high debt and hyper-inflation of Poland, the former Yugoslavia, and
Russia (since it assumed all FSU debts) created challenges which were distinctly
different from those existent in the Czech Republic, Estonia or Romania. Yet the
differences at the starting point of transition go beyond macroeconomic conditions,
the strength of the civil society, economic structures and per capita GDP. One must
also mention cultural differences; regardless of how painful that devilishly difficult
variable is to accurately measure and how strongly this interjection is resented by
some political scientists and economists. By considering the impact of cultural
differences does not at all mean that the presence of values which may not conform to
the ‘best practices of capitalism’ as conceived in advanced economies are an
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unassailable burden to establishing capitalism. As with the case of South Korea and
Taiwan in the 1980s, in the 1990s most of these 28 transition countries have
demonstrated that policy decisions and reforms can modify their long standing
traditions in order to fully implement a market economy. The development of
capitalism in any country should not be a counter weight to cultural values, but
should be an outgrowth of them. Nonetheless, it would be still be wise to recognize
the advantages held by some societies whose
dominant values are more compatible with private ownership and open market
economic activities, as opposed to those whose values are heavily influenced, for
example, by powerful clan based loyalties, or where traditional informal practices
conflict with legal structures developed in most capitalist societies. I want to stress
that there is a definite limit to the impact of dominant social values. I am not certainly
not suggesting that there exist certain ‘national consciousnesses’ which are better
suited to capitalism (and the same reasoning, of course, applies to the suitability of
democracy). However, with some trepidation, I am suggesting that it would be
helpful to consider the impact of contrasting cultural situations. For example,
Croatia’s familiarity with market activities stemming from its historical traditions as
part of the Habsburg Empire, and more recently the relatively open economy of the
former Yugoslavia, should be viewed as an initial advantage over the dominant
values found in Central Asian societies which have little or no experience with
private ownership or capitalism.
Finally in regard to historical backgrounds and starting points, the depth of the
roots of the pre-transition flawed command economy needs to be considered in an
analysis of the relative success or failure of a country’s transition. Simply put, the
longer an economy (mal)functioned under the principals of a command economy, the
more acute the handicaps in constructing capitalism. The fact that 11 of the 15
countries that were established after the implosion of the Soviet Union experienced
74 years of communism, as opposed to the 45 or so years experienced by countries of
CEE and Southeastern Europe (SEE), is a distinct disadvantage for those 11 FSU
countries.
Impact of Policies and Conflicts
The second variable affecting the success or failure of the transition process is
represented by the policies implemented in the transition process. Policy, like
history, matters, or to paraphrase Anders Aslund, it matters very much if the
transitioning state is led by concerned reformers who have the best interest of the
public in mind, or if it is captured by rent seeking elites who buy political clout to
prevent or delay market reforms (Aslund 2002).
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Estonia, for example, was fortunate to be in a situation where reforming elites
firmly and fully committed the country to a market economy in the early 1990s.
Please note that in stressing active and complete commitment to the market economy
is not the same as advocating the so-called ‘shock treatment’ approach (as was/is the
case in Estonia) as opposed the ‘gradualist’ approach. Nor is a firm commitment to a
functioning market economy the same as holding that all of the market oriented
reforms of the early 1990s were optimally effective. In fact, as we have already noted,
the voucher privatization program of the then Czechoslovakia, was generally counter
productive to sustained economic growth. Czech voucher privatization resulted in
enterprises which lacked capital to upgrade technology, and since almost seventy
percent of these vouchers ended up in the hands of Investment Funds, of which seven
of the largest ten were held by state owned banks, there was too little incentive to
restructure these rapidly privatized firms. Credits were too easily obtained and this
frequently dulled the urgency to restructure in order to enhance efficiency. At worse,
many of the firms had their assets ‘tunneled’ into foreign bank accounts, or were left
to the fate of having multiple owners, and thus complex and generally poor corporate
governance (Orenstein 2001, Myant 2003).
The point is that the specific contents of these early reforms, while important,
were not as important as the strength of the overall commitment to open market
capitalism, and to combating the goals of rent seeking elites, as in Ukraine, or elected
former communists officials who lacked a market agenda, as in Bulgaria and
Romania before 1996. Delayed reforms were the key negative variable, not
necessarily because delaying some aspects of the transition was inherently a bad idea,
but because the delay gave strength to those who opposed serious market oriented
reforms. Bulgaria and Romania waited until economic conditions deteriorated to the
point where the populace forced political change which then initiated genuine reform
processes beginning in 1997. One had hoped that the 2004 Orange Revolution in
Kyiv would provide the stimulus for deep, on-going market oriented reforms and an
opening of the Ukrainian economy. Yet at this time it is not possible to predict the
political strength of reformers versus non-reformers in Ukraine. The political
maneuverings of the summer of 2006 have demonstrated rather clearly that the label
‘revolution’ appears to have been prematurely and perhaps incorrectly applied to the
events of November–December 2004 in Kyiv.
Other countries delayed reforms because of the complications caused by military
conflicts. External as well as internal conflicts are the third variable in determining
the relative success of the transition process. The fiscal policies necessary to finance
military conflicts are often severely disadvantageous to macroeconomic stability and
decisions made by the state under the duress of waging war understandably place
political rationale above economic effectiveness. Conflicts impact trade as can be
seen in Central Asia and the Caucuses where cross-border trade remains costly and
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hindered by past and on-going hostilties. Extensive war damages, human and
material, caused by the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia cannot
be underestimated. Transportation networks were rendered ineffective, factories and
housing stocks were lost, and the displaced refugees placed strains on societies even
after the fighting had ceased. War also took its toll on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova, and Tajikistan.
Attempt at a Score Card
To borrow a phrase from Ivo Druzic (2005), where are these 28 countries on their
‘journeys trough transition time’ ? The answer is, since they all began with different
backgrounds and at different starting points, had varying levels of commitment to
market reforms, and because some avoided external or internal conflicts while others
did not, they are all at different stages of their transition journey. This might be
accurate, but it is not especially helpful.
It is more useful to begin by dividing these 28 countries into three separate
geographical regions, which in turn represent three different transition ‘time zones’.
These three regions are (1) the eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE),
which includes the three Baltic countries and Slovenia, (2) the eight in Southeastern
Europe (SEE), and (3) twelve countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union
(FSU). Moldova could be placed with the SEE countries, but it is here somewhat
arbitrarily considered an FSU country.
The eight countries of CEE have surpassed their 1989 GDP levels, with the
exceptions of Latvia and Lithuania who are very close to their 1989 levels, are
functioning democracies, members of NATO and have thus obtained their much
desired insurance policy for national security issues, and most importantly, since
May 2004 they are all members of the European Union (EU). It may be brash to say,
but I believe that the transition is over for these eight countries. Transition is a bridge
between past and future. It does not imply that the past has become unimportant, nor
that future developments and events will not be critically important to the journey.
Instead the end of transition means that these countries have moved across the bridge
from their former command economies to capitalism and now travel on more secure
terra firma. The events of 1989 were indeed revolutionary, but all revolutions must
end, for either good or ill. Naturally not everything is new and different and much of
what existed before 1989 (values, geographical determinants and even economic
conditions) will continue to exist and impact the future of these countries. Yet their
revolutions, as all revolutions must do eventually, has entered into a period of
normalcy. The feverish pace of radical political and economic change has cooled;
developments are less extreme and more predictable. For the countries of CEE, their
18 Bob Donnorummo
opportunities and challenges are no longer set by revolutionary or transition agendas,
but by the EU. On the other hand, it is a great understatement to note that the
transition in SEE or the FSU is far from over.
Aspects of the Transition
As opposed to discussing the conditions which contribute to success or failure, it is
necessary to comment on some of the constituent parts of the transitions. What
follows does not pretend to be either systematic or comprehensive, rather it is meant
to explore several aspects of this complex process in order to provide useful insights.
In discussing aspects of various transitions my own preferences will surface and at
times the narrative will contain elements both of a survey of developments and a
suggested prescriptions. It is hoped that this approach will not prove to be
unnecessarily confusing.
First, I believe that Joseph Stiglitz (2002) and many other scholars of transition
are correct in stressing the importance of sequencing particular sets of reforms
leading to the establishment of capitalism. Yet some basics are needed up front, as it
were, and generally reforms attempting to establish these basics ought to be
implemented as quickly as possible. In order to ‘build capitalism’ (Aslund’s apt
phrase), prices have to be liberalized in order to establish a functioning market.
Macroeconomic stability is also required, as is open domestic and foreign trade. Into
this mix one also needs to add private property, openness to Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), some form of currency convertibility, and institutions supportive
of the market such as an effective legal infrastructure. The trick is in what order, and
how fast to implement which reforms. It is not surprising that given the absence of
theoretical guideposts to lead reformers out of a command economy into capitalism
mistakes were made. Seventeen years after the start of this revolutionary process
many analysts have strongly criticized international financial institutions, especially
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for their dogged emphasis on
anti-inflationary measures through tight budgetary constraints. The claim is that the
so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ approach was not appropriate for many countries
in this region of the world (Nagy 2003, Papava 2005, Kolodko 2000, Stiglitz 2002).
There is merit in this claim, although it is difficult to image positive economic change
without at least taming inflation. Yet the key variables in progressing through one’s
own ‘transition time’ were not external factors such as international financial
institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, the EU or more recently the World Trade
Organization. While these external actors are important, the bulk of the praise and
blame lies with the level of seriousness and persistence of the initial reformers to an
open market system. As previously stated, the critical dimension was not so much the
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specific contents of the reforms themselves, nor whether they were labeled ‘shock
treatment’ or ‘gradual’, but rather the level of commitment and the tenacity of the
reformers.
The debate between the ‘shock treatment’ approach and the ‘gradualist’ is not an
especially relevant debate (Orenstein, 2001). It is neither necessary not productive;
perhaps explaining why it has persisted so long in academic circles. Much, but not all,
of this debate centers on privatization and, as is the case with freed prices and
macroeconomic stability, it should be recognized privatization is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for ‘building capitalism’. The mixture of these three conditions,
plus others including the free and open trade, convertible currency, and the rule of
law, should be seen as a cocktail of pre-requites, but a cocktail whose exact
proportions vary according to the needs of individual countries. The low inflation
rate found in Hungary (Nagy 2003) and the Czech Republic (Myant, 2003) in 1989
requires a different mixture of ingredients than the high inflation raging in Poland or
Russia at that time. Furthermore, it is not even possible to accurately or clearly define
a ‘shock treatment’ country as opposed to a ‘gradualist’ one. For example, Poland is
considered to have pursued a radical ‘shock treatment’ approach, yet it delayed the
privatization of over 500 of its largest enterprises until 1997 (Kozarewski 2006).
It bears repeating that the transition to a capitalist economy requires freed prices,
an open economy in terms of trade, currency exchange, FDI, market supportive
institutions such as a legal system which protects property rights, processes
bankruptcies, assists the formation of new businesses, etc., and certainly private
ownership. The emphasis placed on each component for a specific country will
necessarily vary according the needs and strengthens of that country. Nonetheless, I
believe the evidence points to the fact it was an economic advantage for countries to
work for a more rapid, as opposed to slower, establishment of those component parts.
In addition to what reforms, and how fast or how slow should they be
implemented, an important relevant question often raised is the size and relative
strength of the state in transition economies. Of course, the extension of the state’s
powers had to be severely curtailed from what existed in a command economy.
However, a weak state or a nearly failed sate as in Tajikistan, or one captured by
oligarchic rent seekers as in Ukraine (Wilson 2005b), faces the realistic risk of being
led by elites who will work hard to divert, delay and perhaps defeat the construction
of a functioning market economy (Aslund 2002). In sum, a weak and ineffective
state, as well as a state with an over powering presence, or put another way, one with
either too little or too much control over the economy, are both negative factors. The
weak Albanian state was not able to terminate or even contain a pyramid scheme in
1997 before losing almost one-third of its GDP. Conversely, in Ukraine oligarchic
clans diverted money into their own pockets and became extremely wealthy by
exercising rights granted to them by the all-intrusive state to buy energy at low
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subsidized prices and sell a portion abroad at much higher world market prices. Yet
stronger states, Poland or Estonia for example, were able to effectively govern and
implement policies even though it was clear to all that these policies would create
deprivations in the short term.
Many scholars of transition failed to place due emphasis on the importance of
good governance, the rule of law and an effective legal infrastructure. We all would
have benefited from a closer reading of Hernando de Sota (2000) who fully
appreciated the fundamentally importance relationship between laws, property rights
and economic growth.
An effective state and the rule of law are two sides of the same coin; they exist
only in tandem. I think all could agree that the state must be involved in the economy
to some degree, even if only at the minimum level of establishing and enforcing the
rules of the market place. However, most would also agree that the state must be able
to collect taxes so that it can finance such important public functions as health care,
education, defense, and environmental protection. Others (and I would add,
correctly) want taxes to also assist with income redistributing policies which aid the
weakest or most vulnerable in our societies. Assistance to those in need via income
redistribution is especially important in transition societies which have had to replace
their previous social safety nets, yet still provide for unemployment insurance,
welfare benefits, numerous pensioners, etc. These countries need to be cognizant of
the potential negative ramifications of the rising number of poor people, and the
sometimes acute inequalities found in their societies. The Gini indexes of these
countries have increased, and some like Russia’s have increased sharply. Acute
inequalities also exist in some transition countries in terms of the difference in wealth
between the majority nationality and minorities. A particularly challenging situation
exists with the Roma in several CEE and SEE countries.
An additional and important aspect of the transition process is the need to open
domestic and foreign trade, as well as to attract FDI, both of which perform the vital
function of connecting transition economies to the global economy. The World Bank
(2005) and others (Allan 2000, Winiecki, 2002) have published excellent works on
the subject of foreign trade in transition countries. I will thus only touch upon the
multi-dimensional importance of FDI. The investment in production and services by
foreign companies, unlike highly mobile portfolio investments, is capable of
expanding the activities of domestic suppliers selling to or servicing the foreign
investor, improving management skills in a variety of sectors but especially in
financial services, and injecting new technology into the host country. Nonetheless,
this is a generalization and recently many economists have rightfully stressed that not
all forms of FDI are long term engines of growth. ‘Greenfield’ FDI adds to
production, employment, technology, etc. , while a Merger and Acquisition
involving a multinational firm may simply result in a change of ownership. The
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presence of Free Enterprise Zones in transition countries has a mixed record in terms
of FDI increasing exports and expanding (‘spillover’) the technology base. FDI that
flows into a transition country solely because of the presence of low wages or does
not advance the existing technologies should be questioned before huge tax benefits
are awarded to the potential foreign investors. This complaint is heard in Slovakia, in
spite of substantial FDI in the auto industry, (Soltes 2004) and in Croatia where some
have noted that there is far too little new ‘greenfield’ investments (Vuksic 2006) and
that the country’s technological base is not being advanced by the type of FDI
presently flowing into Croatia. While these disclaimers concerning FDI are accurate
and reasonable, the generally positive effects of FDI on foreign trade and economic
growth cannot be ignored, in both transition countries as well as all economies (Sachs
2005). While FDI by itself will not guarantee increased economic growth, with the
proper facilitating conditions existent in the host country it will introduce and cause
the spread of new management skills and technologies, provide a expanded market
for domestic suppliers, and assist in increasing exports by making other domestic
firms more efficient or by being plugged into sales to a parent company. The role of
FDI as a leading factor in increasing exports can be observed in Hungary, Lithuania
and elsewhere. Increased exposure to foreign markets is undeniably important
element of growth in the export-led economies of transitional countries. Almost
two-thirds of the Czech economy, for example, is based on exports. FDI, like so many
aspects of the transition, is an important component for success, but it is not a cure-all
and progress along one’s ’transition time’ will largely be determined by the quality of
host country’s infrastructure, work force and leadership, as well as its ability to
improve its economic situation on a number of different fronts. Yet the fact that
Estonia, Hungary and the Czech Republic have roughly about $4,500 FDI per capita,
while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have less than $40, is a difference that does impact
export capacity and economic growth in favor of the former.
Finally we come to what is the cornerstone or key building block of capitalism
(and I would add democracy as well), that is, private property. As previously noted,
privatization is absolutely necessary, but not sufficient, for a successful transition.
Some of the errors of the early transition period were the result of a failure to fully
comprehend the limitations of both the market and privatization. There was often an
over emphasis of what private ownership (or more generally, the market) by itself
could accomplish. It was falsely assumed that if a country opened its economy and
privatized, all the malfunctions of the flawed communist ancient regime would
disappear and matters would set right. One can hold that this was an extremely naïve
expectation without being in the least bit opposed to an open economy or private
property.
I do not agree with the former leader of China, Deng Xiao-ping, who reportedly
had said that he did not care if a cat was socialist or capitalist, as long as it caught
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mice. No, not me, I much prefer the efficiency of a capitalist cat since I like the
chances of an independent or privately owned cat operating within the context of an
open market economy catching more mice on a sustainable, long term basis. Yet it
must be stated that while there is the need to privatize, it need not be done all at once,
nor is there some model which dictates how much must be privatized, even though
most, including myself, believe a large majority of the economy should be privatized
at the end of transition’s road. There is no blue print that stipulates that everything,
including airlines, public transportation or even the production and distribution of
raw materials and energy must be privately owned. The later discussion is a
particularly contentious issue considering the recent events in Bolivia and
Venezuela, or Russia’s policies under President Putin which have also increased the
role of the state in oil and gas industries and maintained control in the energy
transport sector. Nor is there a set formula whereby all transition countries must
privatize everything, or nearly everything, in three, five or whatever number of years.
The point is that there is not one specific model of capitalism (the same is true about
democracy). The basics components of capitalism must exist and dominant, but the
precise shapes that these basic elements assume should be determined by the
prevalent cultural values, relative strength of civil society, existing economic
structures, level of economic development, and security needs of each individual
state/society.
The Future
It must be stresses that the countries of SEE and the FSU countries (excluding the
Baltic countries) must recognize that their transition is not over, much remains to be
done, and that the political will to continue and advance this revolutionary process
must be strong and forceful. If this fundamental position is not accepted they face the
very real risk of having the transition ambushed by elites wishing to distort, delay or
even halt a market dominated transition. These elites could be either corrupted rent
seekers or populists, but in either case, the results could be a stunted, deformed and
possibly even mortally wounded transition.
The future of the FSU countries is, and will be, very strongly impacted by
developments in Russia. The foreign trade patterns of the FSU countries are
becoming more ‘Russia-centric’, as opposed to CEE and SEE countries whose
foreign trade is becoming ‘Euro-centric’ (World Bank 2005). The export patterns of
the FSU countries is also becoming dangerously lopsided and dependant on
commodities (especially oil, natural gas, ores), as well as metals and agricultural
products, while value added manufactured goods and service exports are either
scarce or extremely limited. Furthermore, FSU countries (especially Central Asian
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countries) are not becoming increasingly integrated into global economy and this has
troubling ramifications. Russia is the dominant trade partner of the Central Asian
countries (up to 70 percent), and its sheer size causes a very unbalanced relationship
to exist. Russia’s ability, and apparent willingness, to use its abundant energy
resources (and possession and control of much of the existing pipeline infrastructure)
to enforce its economic hegemony over countries like Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine
and those of Central Asia is a powerful determining factor in shaping the transition
paths undertaken by these countries. Dependency is never the preferred option, but in
truth these countries have limited options. They can decide to fully coordinate their
policies with Russia and minimize their independence like Belarus, or attempt to
strengthen their independence by diversifying their energy sources, using their
energy much more effectively, and developing alternative sources like nuclear
power. While they should diversify, conserve and develop alternative sources, their
foreign policy must also attempt to develop a mutually beneficial politically and
economically relationship with Russia. In the final analysis, they need what Russia
has, energy and a market for their goods. Geography also matters.
The situation in SEE and CEE is different. For them the EU is the dominant factor
in any forward looking political and economic analysis. The eight countries of CEE
are already members of the EU, and Romania and Bulgaria will be soon, and
hopefully they will be followed by Croatia, later Turkey and the Western Balkans.
Beginning with the very start of the transition process, there was a dramatic shift of
the foreign trade of these eight CEE countries from eastern to western markets (Smith
2000, Winiecki 2002). For example, in 1988 Bulgaria exported about 80 percent of
its goods to Council of Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) countries, but today about
55% of its foreign trade is with the EU-15, that is, the pre-May 2004 members.
Furthermore, the existing trade of these countries with Russia is heavily unbalanced
and dominated by the import of oil and gas.
The pattern for Croatia is different. Before 1989 it was part of the former
Yugoslavia and therefore trade with Slovenia was not ‘foreign’, and Croatia’s
foreign trade was rather evenly divided between Italy, Germany and Russia. Today
about two-thirds of its foreign trade is with the EU-15. While this pattern is to be
expected and not unwise, the fact that only 20 percent of its exports and a mere 4
percent of its imports are from other SEE countries does seem to represent a missed
opportunity. In this case, SEE does not include Slovenia, but does include Turkey,
Cyprus and Greece (Papazoglou 2005), which, unlike the smaller Western Balkan
countries are wealthier and/or significantly larger markets. While SEE countries have
traditionally not traded with each other for a variety of political and economic reasons
(Donnorummo 2002), there are now a few positive signs indicating increased
intra-regional trade and energy/power sharing as agreed at the 2002 Athens
Conference. Nonetheless, the existing low level of intra-SEE economic interaction,
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that is, interaction with immediate neighbors, would appear to be somewhat
counterproductive and not in the best interest of long term development. The
inhibiting legacy of past conflicts as a reason for the relative absence of intra-SEE
foreign trade seems to a weakening determinant and one that belongs to the past (yet,
unfortunately, this only slightly diminishes its importance). Effective leadership
requires a more visionary look into the future. Among Croatia’s top ten foreign
trading partners, only Bosnia-Herzegovina is listed, and then only for exports, not
imports. I am not suggesting that Croatia’s foreign trade patterns should lessen its
focus on western markets and the EU, but at the same time there are potentially
significant positive economic outcomes and national security benefits to be realized
from increased economic interaction (trade and energy sharing) with other SEE
countries.
The above statement should not be interpreted as an Euro-skeptic position.
Foreign trade is not a ‘zero-sum’ game whereby their must be either a EU or SEE
focus. In fact, increased trade amongst SEE countries might be conceived as a
prelude to a SEE free trade association, which in turn would be a stepping stone to
joining the EU in the future. I fully understand and agree with the high percentage of
CEE voters (and presumably future SEE voters) that supported for their country’s
entry into the EU with approvals ranging between 67 and 92 percent in pre-accession
referenda. EU membership collaborates and confirms their ‘Europeaness’, and
means greater access to a large and wealthy market. When this is combined with
NATO membership, it also represents greater national security and stability, which in
turn enhances the likelihood of increased FDI.
Yet the EU is not a magical silver bullet that will solve all problems. It is a step in
the right direction, but the keys to growing these economies remain in the possession
of the individual nation states. The IMF, World Bank, European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development, EU, NATO, and WTO are important external
agents, but success will be determined even more so by actions taken in Warsaw or
Zagreb, not Washington or Brussels. Ireland has shown the most effective path to
growing one’s economy by wisely using its membership in the EU to its fullest
advantage in terms of trade opportunities and infrastructure improvements via
structural assistance, but also by implementing domestic policies which opened up
the economy, lowered taxes and established other market friendly reforms that have
brought it from about 60 percent of the average EU of GDP per capita to over 125
percent in less than 35 years.
One hopes that the EU-15 can learn from the experiences of its new and pending
members. Progress and growth have come from a reduction of the role of the state in
the economy, by opening and not over regulating the market. However, at the same
time the state has remained active in the more successful economies of CEE and has
not abrogated its responsibilities to that somewhat amorphous ’market’. In sum, the
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West has much to learn from the East. The substantially higher growth rates of the
CEE counties as compared to those of the EU-15 should serve as a motivating
example for some of the overly regulated and presently low growth economies in the
western half of the continent.
As a non-European, I much admire the post-1945 achievement of Western
Europe, the post-1989 achievements of eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent,
developments in the FSU since 1991. I want and welcome a strong Europe (and
Eurasia), both economically and militarily. Together with United States, and other
developed countries, we can be effective partners in defeating, or at least containing,
such global treats like poverty, terrorism, AIDS, energy needs and environmental
problems.
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